# Software Supply Chain Security & SBOM Services

**URL:** https://securesys.com.tr/en/services/software-supply-chain-security-sbom

Modern software is not made up solely of source code written by an organisation's own developers. Open-source libraries, third-party packages, frameworks, container images, build tools, CI/CD pipelines, package repositories and externally sourced software components make up a significant portion of modern applications.

While this accelerates software development, it also brings a new security domain with it: **Software Supply Chain Security**.

An application having secure source code of its own does not mean the whole application is secure. An open-source library the application uses may contain a critical vulnerability, the build pipeline may be compromised, a malicious package may be pulled in as a dependency, or a container image believed to be trustworthy may contain risky components.

In a modern application security approach, therefore, it is not only the source code that must be protected but the entire chain through which the software is produced and distributed.

Within **SecureSys Software Supply Chain Security & SBOM Services** we address these processes together:

- Software Bill of Materials – SBOM,
- Software Composition Analysis – SCA,
- open source dependency security,
- third-party component security,
- package security,
- repository security,
- CI/CD pipeline security,
- build security,
- artifact security,
- container image security,
- secret scanning,
- vulnerability management,
- dependency monitoring

Our core approach is to create security visibility across this entire chain:

**Developer → Source Code → Dependency → Repository → CI/CD → Build → Artifact → Container → Registry → Deployment → Production**

### What Is a Software Supply Chain?

A software supply chain describes all the components and processes used while a software product is developed, built, packaged, distributed and run in production.

A modern software supply chain can contain many components, such as:

- developer,
- source code,
- Git repository,
- open source libraries,
- third-party packages,
- package manager,
- build system,
- CI/CD pipeline,
- container image,
- artifact repository,
- container registry,
- deployment platform,
- cloud infrastructure

A security problem at any point in this chain can affect the final software product.

### What Is Software Supply Chain Security?

Software Supply Chain Security is a security approach that aims to protect the entire software development and distribution chain against attack, manipulation and vulnerabilities.

The goal is not merely to scan application code.

It is also to make visible:

- where the code came from,
- which dependencies are in use,
- how the build was performed,
- whether the artifact has been altered,
- which container image went into production

### Why Has the Software Supply Chain Become Critical?

In modern software development, a significant portion of applications is built using ready-made components.

An application might contain, for example:

- 50,000 lines of in-house code,
- hundreds of open-source packages,
- dozens of transitive dependencies

In that case the organisation is affected not only by the code it wrote itself, but by every third-party component it uses.

A single critical dependency vulnerability can affect hundreds of applications.

### Third-Party Software Risk

The security of third-party components in the software organisations use is an important risk area.

A third-party component may contain:

- vulnerabilities,
- malicious code,
- unsupported packages,
- outdated versions,
- licence risk

The SecureSys Software Supply Chain Security service helps make these risks visible.

### Open Source Security

Open-source software is one of the foundations of the modern application development ecosystem.

When open-source usage is left uncontrolled, however, the following can find their way into applications:

- packages containing vulnerabilities,
- dependencies that are never updated,
- abandoned projects,
- malicious packages

Open-source usage therefore needs to be managed centrally.

### Software Composition Analysis – SCA

Software Composition Analysis analyses the open-source and third-party components used in applications.

SCA tools can analyse information about:

- package,
- library,
- dependency,
- version,
- known vulnerability,
- licence

This lets the organisation see which application uses which component.

### Why Is SCA Necessary?

Source code security analysis mostly evaluates the code the organisation has written.

Yet a significant portion of the risk in modern applications can come from third-party dependencies.

SCA makes it possible to build this relationship:

**Application → Component → Version → Vulnerability**

### What Is a Direct Dependency?

Packages added to an application directly by a developer are called direct dependencies.

For example, an npm package added by a developer to a Node.js project is a direct dependency.

### What Is a Transitive Dependency?

The packages a package itself uses are called transitive dependencies.

Even though the developer does not add them directly, they become part of the application's dependency tree.

Checking only direct dependencies is therefore not enough.

### Dependency Tree Analysis

In the SecureSys SCA approach, an application's dependency tree can be analysed.

For example:

#### Application

↓

#### Package A

↓

#### Package B

↓

#### Vulnerable Package C

This makes it possible to establish which dependency brought a critical vulnerability into the application.

### What Is an SBOM?

An **SBOM – Software Bill of Materials** is a structured inventory of the components inside a software product.

An SBOM is the software world's equivalent of the bill of materials used for physical products.

An SBOM can contain information such as:

- component name,
- component version,
- package,
- supplier,
- dependency relationship,
- identifier

### Why Does an SBOM Matter?

When a vulnerability is published, an organisation's first question is usually:

#### “Are we using this component?”

In environments without an SBOM, finding the answer can take days.

An SBOM makes it possible to establish this relationship far more quickly:

**Vulnerability → Component → Application**

### Software Inventory Through SBOM

An SBOM is not used only for vulnerability management.

It can also help build an inventory of the organisation's software components.

For example, if an organisation has 200 applications, it can centrally track which of these each one uses:

- framework,
- package,
- library,
- component

### SBOM Formats

SBOM data can be produced in different standard formats.

Common formats include:

- CycloneDX,
- SPDX

These formats help software component information to be shared in a machine-readable way.

### CycloneDX SBOM

CycloneDX is one of the SBOM formats widely used particularly in software supply chain and application security scenarios.

Application components and dependency relationships can be described in a structured form.

### SPDX SBOM

SPDX is one of the open standards used for software components, licences and package information.

Either CycloneDX or SPDX can be considered for enterprise SBOM processes.

### SBOM Generation Service

SecureSys can design SBOM generation processes for existing applications.

An SBOM can be produced from:

- source code,
- build pipeline,
- container image,
- package manifest

### Automated SBOM Generation

In modern [DevSecOps](/en/services/devops-devsecops-services) environments, an SBOM should not be created manually.

An SBOM can be generated automatically after every build inside the CI/CD pipeline.

For example:

#### Git Commit

↓

#### Build

↓

#### SCA

↓

#### SBOM Generation

↓

#### Artifact

This makes it possible to produce a current SBOM for every software version.

### Continuous SBOM

Because software dependencies change constantly, an SBOM should not be treated as a one-off document.

It can be updated after every release or build.

This approach can be described as **Continuous SBOM**.

### SBOM Repository

SBOMs produced inside the organisation can be stored in a central repository.

For example, records can be kept per version:

**Application A → Version 3.1 → SBOM**

**Application A → Version 3.2 → SBOM**

**Application B → Version 7.0 → SBOM**

### SBOM and Vulnerability Intelligence

SBOM data can be correlated with vulnerability intelligence sources.

When a new CVE is published, the applications using the affected component can be identified automatically.

This model can work as:

**New CVE → Component Match → Affected Applications → Security Alert**

### Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange – VEX

An SBOM can show that a component is present inside an application.

Whether that component's vulnerability is genuinely exploitable in the application, however, is a separate question.

The VEX approach helps express the exploitability status of a vulnerability for a specific product or application.

### Using SBOM and VEX Together

An SBOM answers:

#### Which component is present?

VEX helps evaluate:

#### Does this vulnerability actually affect us?

Used together, these two approaches allow vulnerability management to be prioritised more accurately.

### CVE Tracking

SCA and SBOM systems can correlate known CVE records with an application's components.

When a new vulnerability is published, the affected dependencies can be identified.

### CVSS Risk Assessment

CVSS scores can be used when assessing vulnerability severity.

Acting on the CVSS score alone, however, is not always sufficient.

### Exploit Probability with EPSS

Models such as EPSS can provide an additional risk indicator for the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited in the real world.

In its vulnerability prioritisation process, SecureSys can weigh these factors together:

**CVSS + Exploitability + Asset Criticality + Exposure**

### Risk-Based Vulnerability Management

A High vulnerability in an internet-facing critical application, for example, may carry higher operational priority than a Critical vulnerability in an internal test environment.

SecureSys can therefore apply a risk-based remediation approach.

### Dependency Vulnerability Monitoring

Dependency security should not be checked only at build time.

A package that is safe today may have a new CVE published against it tomorrow.

Continuously monitoring the dependencies of production applications is therefore important.

### Continuous Dependency Monitoring

SecureSys can build continuous dependency security with this model:

**Application Inventory → SBOM → Vulnerability Feed → Continuous Monitoring**

### Dependency Update Management

A dependency with a vulnerability may need to be upgraded to a newer version.

An uncontrolled dependency update can break the application, however.

These processes should therefore be managed together:

- vulnerability,
- compatibility,
- testing,
- release

### Package Security

Modern software makes heavy use of package repositories such as:

- npm,
- PyPI,
- Maven,
- NuGet,
- RubyGems

Package security is an important part of Software Supply Chain Security.

### Malicious Package Risk

Attackers can upload malicious packages to open package repositories.

A developer may include such a package in a project by mistake.

Package sources therefore need to be checked.

### Typosquatting Attacks

In typosquatting attacks, an attacker publishes a malicious package under a name resembling a popular one.

If a developer mistypes the package name, they may download the malicious component.

### Dependency Confusion

In dependency confusion attacks, private package names are published on a public repository in the hope that the build system will download the attacker's package.

This risk matters particularly where public and private package repositories are used together.

### Private Package Repository

SecureSys can support the creation of a private package repository inside the organisation.

This structure can enable controlled use of packages for:

- Maven,
- npm,
- NuGet,
- PyPI

### Repository Proxy

Rather than developer teams accessing package repositories on the internet directly, a central proxy can be used.

For example:

**Developer → Private Repository → Approved External Repository**

This structure allows package usage to be controlled centrally.

### Package Allowlist

An allowlist approach can be applied so that only approved packages are used inside the organisation.

### Package Blocklist

The use of packages carrying critical vulnerabilities or security risk can be blocked centrally.

### Git Repository Security

Software Supply Chain Security starts at the source code repository.

These controls can be applied on a Git repository:

- MFA,
- branch protection,
- access control,
- code review,
- commit protection,
- secret scanning

### Branch Protection

Committing directly to a production branch can be prevented.

Changes can be required to pass through this process:

**Developer → Pull/Merge Request → Review → Approval → Merge**

### Code Review

Having critical changes reviewed by at least a second developer is an important software security control.

### Signed Commits

Commit signing mechanisms can be used to verify that commits were created by trusted developers.

### Secret Scanning

Finding the following inside a repository creates serious security risk:

- API key,
- access token,
- password,
- private key,
- cloud credential

Secret scanning tools can detect sensitive information inside a repository and its commit history.

### Pre-Commit Security

Security checks can be run before the developer commits.

A pre-commit hook can perform checks for:

- secrets,
- code quality,
- basic security

### CI/CD Supply Chain Security

The CI/CD pipeline is one of the most critical components of the software supply chain.

A compromised pipeline can give an attacker access to:

- source code,
- build system,
- credentials,
- artifact repository,
- production

### Pipeline Access Security

User and service account privileges on CI/CD platforms should be managed according to the principle of least privilege.

### Pipeline Secret Security

Information used inside the pipeline, such as:

- deployment credential,
- cloud token,
- registry password,
- API key

must be held in secure secret management systems.

### Build Environment Security

The runners or build servers where builds are performed are critical security components.

These systems should run:

- isolated,
- up to date,
- with minimum privilege,
- monitored

### Ephemeral Build Environment

A temporary runner can be created for each build and destroyed once the job completes.

This approach can reduce the risk of persistent data or credentials being left between build environments.

### Build Integrity

It is important to verify that the software artifact produced by a build was created from the expected source code.

Build provenance and signing mechanisms can be considered for this purpose.

### Build Provenance

Build provenance provides verifiable information about:

- which source code,
- which build system,
- which process

an artifact was produced from.

### Artifact Security

The artifact produced by a build may be a:

- binary,
- library,
- package,
- container image

That artifact must not be altered after it has been produced.

### Artifact Signing

Artifact signing allows the integrity and origin of a software package to be verified.

Signature checks can be performed before production deployment.

### Artifact Repository Security

Artifact repositories are critical systems where an organisation stores its production software.

These controls can be applied on the repository:

- MFA,
- RBAC,
- encryption,
- immutable artifacts,
- logging

### Container Supply Chain Security

In container-based applications, the software supply chain extends down to the container image level.

A container image can contain hundreds of packages.

### Container Image Scanning

Container images can be scanned for these risks:

- OS vulnerability,
- library vulnerability,
- malware,
- secrets,
- configuration

### Base Image Security

Developer teams should not use arbitrary public base images.

Approved and up-to-date base images can be created by the organisation.

For example:

#### SecureSys Approved Base Image

↓

#### Application Layer

↓

#### Security Scan

↓

#### Private Registry

### Minimal Container Image

Removing packages that are not needed inside a container can reduce the attack surface.

A minimal image approach is important for this reason.

### Container Registry Security

Storing container images in a private registry can improve supply chain security.

These can be applied within the registry:

- [vulnerability scanning](/en/services/cyber-security-software),
- image signing,
- RBAC,
- retention,
- audit logging

### Image Signing

Container images can be signed and their signatures verified at deployment time.

This makes it possible to ensure that only images approved by the organisation run in production.

### Kubernetes Admission Control

Containers to be deployed to a Kubernetes cluster can be checked through admission policy.

For example, these policies can be created:

**Unsigned Image → Block**

**Critical Vulnerability → Block**

**Unknown Registry → Block**

### Policy as Code

Software Supply Chain Security policies can be defined as code.

For example:

**No SBOM → No Release**

**Critical CVE → No Deployment**

**Unsigned Artifact → No Production**

**Hardcoded Secret → Build Fail**

This approach allows security policies to be enforced automatically.

### Security Gate

A security gate can be built into the CI/CD pipeline so that builds above a defined risk level are prevented from reaching production.

For example:

**Critical → Block**

**High → Security Approval**

**Medium → Remediation Plan**

**Low → Monitor**

### SAST and Software Supply Chain Security

SAST analyses the source code an organisation develops itself.

SCA analyses third-party components.

For this reason:

#### SAST + SCA

should be used together.

### SAST, SCA and SBOM

In a modern application security approach, these can be thought of as:

**SAST → First-Party Code**

**SCA → Third-Party Components**

**SBOM → Component Inventory**

### DAST and Supply Chain Security

DAST tests the security behaviour of a running application.

It can be used as a complementary layer to supply chain security controls.

### DevSecOps Integration

Software Supply Chain Security controls should be integrated into the DevSecOps pipeline.

An example SecureSys pipeline:

#### Developer

↓

#### Git

↓

#### Secret Scan

↓

#### SAST

↓

#### SCA

↓

#### SBOM

↓

#### Build

↓

#### Artifact Signing

↓

#### Container Scan

↓

#### Security Gate

↓

#### Deployment

↓

#### Continuous Monitoring

### Software Supply Chain Security and DevOps

Security controls should not bring developer teams to a complete stop.

They should therefore be automated as far as possible.

### Software Supply Chain Security and Platform Engineering

Supply chain controls can be standardised for all developer teams through an [Internal Developer Platform](/en/services/platform-engineering-idp-services).

For example, these can be enabled by default within a Golden Path:

- SAST,
- SCA,
- SBOM,
- image scanning,
- artifact signing

### Golden Path Security

Application templates created within Platform Engineering can be delivered together with a secure pipeline.

Developers do not have to configure security tools one by one.

### Software Supply Chain and Zero Trust

No component in the software supply chain should be treated as trusted simply because it sits inside the network.

Every one of these must be verified:

- developer,
- build system,
- artifact,
- container,
- deployment

### Least Privilege

Build and deployment accounts should be granted only the privileges they need.

A CI/CD account holding administrator access to the entire production infrastructure should be prevented.

### Software Supply Chain and PAM

Privileged accounts on critical build and deployment systems can be managed with PAM.

### Software Supply Chain and SIEM

Critical events in the software development infrastructure can be forwarded to [SIEM](/en/services/siem-and-soar-security-service).

For example, these events can be monitored:

- repository admin change,
- branch protection removal,
- pipeline modification,
- artifact deletion,
- registry login,
- failed authentication

### Software Supply Chain and 24/7 SOC

The SecureSys [24/7 SOC](/en/services/soc-7x24-monitoring-managed-soc-service) service can monitor critical security events coming from development and software supply chain systems.

Security is therefore not limited to the production environment alone.

### Supply Chain Incident Response

Rapid response is needed when an attack on the software supply chain is detected.

When a malicious package is detected, for example:

- The affected component is identified.
- The SBOM repository is queried.
- The affected applications are listed.
- Production exposure is determined.
- The package is blocked.
- A safe version is prepared.
- The applications are rebuilt.
- Deployment is carried out.

### Incident Response with SBOM

An SBOM can accelerate incident response particularly in critical zero-day situations.

Rather than manually checking hundreds of applications when a new vulnerability is published, the central SBOM inventory can be queried.

### Software Supply Chain Risk Assessment

SecureSys can carry out a Software Supply Chain Security assessment of an existing software development environment.

The analysis can examine:

- Git,
- dependencies,
- package repository,
- CI/CD,
- build server,
- artifact repository,
- container registry,
- Kubernetes,
- secrets

### SBOM Readiness Assessment

An organisation's readiness to produce SBOMs can be evaluated.

The work analyses:

- application inventory,
- build systems,
- dependency managers,
- CI/CD,
- artifact systems

### Open Source Governance

A policy can be established covering which open-source components may be used inside the organisation.

### License Compliance

Open-source packages must be assessed not only for security but also for licensing.

SCA solutions can analyse package licence information and help make potential licence risks visible.

### Detecting End-of-Life Components

Using libraries or frameworks that are no longer supported can create significant security risk.

SecureSys can enable the detection of EOL components.

### Legacy Dependency Management

Older applications may contain dependencies that cannot be updated.

In that case the risk can be reduced with these mechanisms:

- network isolation,
- WAF,
- monitoring,
- compensating controls

### Supplier SBOM Management

An organisation can request an SBOM not only for the software it develops itself, but also for the software it purchases.

SBOMs provided by vendors can be stored centrally.

### Third-Party SBOM Analysis

An SBOM received from a software vendor can be analysed by SecureSys to detect:

- vulnerable components,
- outdated packages,
- EOL components,
- dependency risk

### Vendor Software Risk Assessment

Before new software is purchased, the vendor's capabilities can be assessed in:

- secure development,
- SBOM,
- vulnerability management,
- patch process,
- disclosure process

### Software Procurement Security

Software Supply Chain Security can be extended as far as procurement processes.

Technical specifications can define requirements for:

- SBOM delivery,
- vulnerability remediation,
- secure development,
- patch SLA

### SBOM and Public Sector Software Projects

Visibility of the third-party components used in critical software developed for public institutions is important.

An SBOM approach can help an organisation record which components the software it takes delivery of is made from.

### SBOM and Critical Infrastructure

In energy, finance, defence, telecoms and other critical infrastructure, software component visibility matters for operational cyber resilience.

### NIST SSDF and Software Supply Chain Security

The NIST Secure Software Development Framework addresses areas such as protecting software and its components, producing well-secured software and responding to vulnerabilities.

Software Supply Chain Security processes can be regarded as one of the important parts of a Secure SDLC approach.

### OWASP and Software Supply Chain Security

OWASP resources can be used when building dependency security, software component analysis and DevSecOps security controls.

### The SLSA Approach

SLSA – Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts is a framework aimed at increasing the trustworthiness of the production chain for software artifacts.

These areas matter in the SLSA approach:

- source integrity,
- build integrity,
- provenance,
- artifact integrity

### Build Provenance and SLSA

Build provenance makes it possible to produce verifiable information about which source code and build system an artifact was created with.

This approach can help reduce software supply chain attacks.

### Secure Build Pipeline

In a secure build pipeline architecture, SecureSys can assess these controls together:

- protected source,
- isolated runner,
- trusted dependency,
- SCA,
- SBOM,
- artifact signing,
- provenance

### Reproducible Builds

In suitable projects, being able to obtain the same build result from the same source code can increase supply chain trustworthiness.

### Immutable Artifact

An artifact taken into production must be prevented from being altered afterwards.

Immutable release policies can be applied on the artifact repository.

### Production Artifact Verification

These checks can be carried out before deployment:

- signature,
- hash,
- provenance,
- approved registry

### AI Generated Code and Supply Chain Security

The growing use of AI coding assistants also affects software supply chain processes.

Code suggested by AI may contain:

- unknown packages,
- outdated dependencies,
- insecure libraries,
- incorrect package names

AI-generated code should therefore pass through the same supply chain controls.

### AI Dependency Risk

A dependency suggested by an AI coding assistant should not be added directly to a project.

The dependency can be put through this process:

**AI Suggestion → Developer Review → SCA → Approval → Build**

### Software Supply Chain in LLM Applications

Alongside classic packages, LLM and [generative AI](/en/services/llm-generative-ai-solutions) applications can use new types of dependency such as:

- AI framework,
- model,
- embedding library,
- vector database client,
- agent framework

Keeping an inventory of these components matters too.

### The AI BOM Approach

In AI systems, managing inventories of models, datasets and AI components — beyond the classic SBOM approach — is becoming increasingly important.

Enterprise AI governance processes can provide visibility of components such as:

- model,
- model version,
- AI framework,
- dependency,
- data source

### ISO/IEC 42001 and the Software Supply Chain

In organisations building AI systems, managing the third-party AI components, models and frameworks in use is one of the important parts of an AI governance approach.

Software Supply Chain Security processes can strengthen the technical security layer of the AI development lifecycle.

### Software Supply Chain Security KPIs

Supply chain security maturity can be measured.

Example KPIs can be defined as:

- SBOM coverage,
- applications with SCA,
- critical dependency count,
- remediation time,
- unsigned artifacts,
- unsupported packages,
- secret detection count

### SBOM Coverage

The percentage of applications inside the organisation holding a current SBOM can be measured.

For example, a target of:

#### SBOM Coverage: 85%

can be set.

### Critical Dependency SLA

An SLA can be established for remediating dependencies with critical vulnerabilities within a defined period.

### Supply Chain Security Dashboard

SecureSys can present this information on a central dashboard:

- number of applications,
- SBOM status,
- vulnerable components,
- critical CVEs,
- outdated dependencies,
- unsigned artifacts

### Executive Reporting

For senior management, rather than technical dependency detail, indicators such as these can be reported:

- critical application risk,
- SBOM coverage,
- critical vulnerabilities,
- remediation performance,
- supply chain risk trend

### Software Supply Chain Security as a Service

For organisations without an in-house Application Security or Software Supply Chain Security team, the process can be delivered as a managed service.

Within **Software Supply Chain Security as a Service**, SecureSys can manage:

- SCA,
- SBOM,
- dependency monitoring,
- vulnerability prioritisation,
- security reporting,
- remediation tracking

### Managed SBOM Service

With the SecureSys Managed SBOM service, the SBOMs for an organisation's applications can be:

- generated,
- stored centrally,
- kept up to date,
- correlated with vulnerability data,
- reported

### Continuous Software Supply Chain Monitoring

Rather than a one-off scan, applications' dependency inventories can be monitored continuously.

When a new vulnerability is published, the affected applications can be identified and action raised.

### The SecureSys Software Supply Chain Security Service Process

#### \1. Software Inventory

The applications inside the organisation are identified.

#### \2. Development Environment Analysis

Git, CI/CD, build and repository systems are examined.

#### \3. Dependency Discovery

The third-party components applications use are identified.

#### \4. SCA

Dependency vulnerability and licence analysis is performed.

#### \5. SBOM

A Software Bill of Materials is produced per application.

#### \6. CI/CD Integration

SBOM and SCA processes are brought into the pipeline.

#### \7. Repository Security

Git, branch, secret and access policies are assessed.

#### \8. Build Security

Build runner and credential security is checked.

#### \9. Artifact Security

Artifact signing and integrity controls are applied.

#### \10. Container Security

Container image and registry security is assessed.

#### \11. Continuous Monitoring

New vulnerabilities are matched against the SBOM and dependency inventory.

#### \12. Reporting and Improvement

Risks are prioritised and remediation processes tracked.

### Why SecureSys for Software Supply Chain Security?

Modern application security does not consist of [source code analysis](/en/services/source-code-analysis-sast-service) or penetration testing alone.

Even an application built with secure code can be at risk because of a third-party dependency, a CI/CD pipeline or a container image it uses.

SecureSys therefore assesses this chain as a whole:

**Source Code + Dependency + SBOM + CI/CD + Build + Artifact + Container + Runtime**

Our Software Supply Chain Security approach rests on this principle:

**Know What You Use → Verify What You Build → Trust What You Deploy → Monitor What You Run**

### Frequently Asked Questions

#### What is Software Supply Chain Security?

It is securing the source code, dependencies, build, artifacts, containers and deployment components used from software development through to production.

#### What is an SBOM?

A Software Bill of Materials is a structured inventory of the components and dependencies used inside a piece of software.

#### What is SCA?

Software Composition Analysis examines the open-source and third-party dependencies in applications for security and licence risk.

#### Are an SBOM and SCA the same thing?

No. SCA analyses components, while an SBOM produces a structured inventory of software components. Used together they provide stronger visibility.

#### Should an SBOM be produced for every release?

In dynamic development environments, producing a current SBOM for every build or release is likely to be the more accurate approach.

#### Can an SBOM detect CVEs?

An SBOM is not a vulnerability scanner in itself. However, the components inside it can be matched against vulnerability intelligence data to identify affected applications.

#### Can an SBOM be produced for a container image?

Yes. The packages and components inside a container image can be analysed to generate an SBOM.

#### Can an SBOM be integrated into a CI/CD pipeline?

Yes. SBOM generation can be automated during every build.

#### Is Software Supply Chain Security part of DevSecOps?

Yes. SCA, SBOM, secret scanning, artifact security and container security are important parts of modern DevSecOps processes.

#### Can a managed SBOM service be purchased?

Yes. SBOM generation, updating, vulnerability monitoring and reporting can be delivered as a managed service.

### Make Your Software Supply Chain Visible and Secure with SecureSys

The security of a piece of software is not only the security of the code your developer wrote.

The hundreds of open-source dependencies, the build system, the CI/CD pipeline, the container images and the artifacts your application uses are all part of the same security chain.

With SecureSys Software Supply Chain Security & SBOM Services you can manage these processes under a central security model:

**Source Code → SCA → SBOM → Dependency Security → Secure Build → Artifact Signing → Container Security → Deployment → Continuous Monitoring**

Instead of spending days chasing the answer to **“Which of our applications uses this component?”** when a critical vulnerability is published, you can identify the affected systems quickly from your current SBOM and software inventory.

**Have your software supply chain risks analysed, build your SBOM infrastructure, and make every software component you use visible.**